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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Javier Aguilar appeals from his Judgment and Commitment stemming from a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. In 
his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Aguilar has asserted that the district court erred in allowing the 
jury to hear irrelevant testimony, from a purported expert, regarding the long-term 
impact that sexual abuse can have on victims, over the objection of his counsel. He 
further asserted that the State will be unable to show that the district court's error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, Mr. Aguilar asserted that the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive total unified sentence of 
life, with twenty-one years fixed, in light of the mitigating evidence that exists in this 
case. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertion that the district 
court did not err in allowing the expert to opine on the long-term impacts of sexual 
abuse, arguing that the information was relevant to Mr. Aguilar's credibility. As will be 
demonstrated below, the State's argument is without merit. The State's alternative 
argument that the error is harmless and its argument that the district court did not abuse 
its sentencing discretion are unremarkable and will not be addressed in this Reply Brief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Aguilar's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by allowing the State to present expert testimony about 
the negative long-term effects of sexual abuse, over the objection of defense 
counsel, as such testimony was not relevant for the jury's consideration? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in 




The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Present Expert Testimony About The 
Negative Long-Term Effects Of Sexual Abuse, Over The Objection Of Defense 
Counsel, As Such Testimony Was Not Relevant For The Jury'S Consideration 
The jury was asked to determine whether Javier Aguilar committed the crimes of 
lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen, allegedly perpetrated against three 
young boys, years before the trial took place. Over the objection of defense counsel, 
the State was allowed to present testimony from its expert witness about the long-term 
effects of sexual abuse. Mr. Aguilar asserts that the district court erred in allowing this 
testimony to be presented as it was irrelevant as to whether or not Mr. Aguilar 
committed the alleged crimes; thus, the testimony was inadmissible under Idaho Rules 
of Evidence 401 and 402. Furthermore, Mr. Aguilar asserts that the State will be unable 
to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In response, the State argues "Ms. Yeager's [the expert in question] testimony 
about the long-term effects of sexual abuse was pertinent to the victims' credibility, 
which is always relevant." (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) In support of this proposition, the 
State cites to State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 503 (1999), which in turn quotes State v. 
Arledge, 119 Idaho 548,588 (Ct. App. 1991). A closer review of these cases, however, 
reveals that the State's argument is without merit. 
In Hairston, a defendant charged with two counts of murder and one count of 
robbery, argued that the district court erred in allowing the State to present evidence on 
rebuttal that he had shot a convenience store clerk in Colorado, two days before the 
victims in his case were murdered. Hairston at 501. Prior to trial, the district court ruled 
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that the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial impact; 
however, after the defendant testified and presented himself as a follower who was 
shocked when he saw his co-defendant shoot the victims, the court allowed the 
evidence to be entered as '''impeachment and prior bad acts.'" Id. at 501-502. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held as follows: 
It appears that Hairston himself opened the door for the admission of the 
Colorado evidence. Hairston admitted that he was at the Fuhrimans' 
house on January 6 when they were shot. He testified, however, that 
Klipfel was the one who shot them. The defense in this case was 
premised upon Hairston as the follower, who was shocked when Klipfel 
shot the Fuhrimans and only remained with Klipfel after the murders 
because he was scared. Once Hairston testified that he had not fired the 
gun prior to January 6th, that he had never seen anyone shot before, and 
that he had never pointed a gun at anyone, the Colorado evidence 
became relevant to impeach his credibility. 
Id. at 502-503. As the State correctly notes, the Hairston Court quoted the Idaho Court 
of Appeals' holding in State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588 (Ct. App. 1991), stating 
'''whenever evidence is introduced for purposes of impeachment, it necessarily involves 
a witness' credibility, and credibility is always relevant.'" Id. at 503. 
In Arledge, the defendant charged with multiple crimes occurring at his fiance's 
house, a defense witness testified that the defendant had been staying at the house for 
"about two days." Arledge at 586-587. The district court allowed the state to present a 
written statement made by the same witness on the day of the incident, that the 
defendant '''had gotten out of jail yesterday.'" Id. at 587. In affirming the district court, 
the Court of Appeals held that, although not specifically included in the language of 
I.R.E. 404(b), that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, may be admissible for 
impeachment purposes. Id. at 587-588. I n analyzing whether the statement was 
relevant, the Court of Appeals made the statement, "whenever evidence is introduced 
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for purposes of impeachment, it necessarily involves a witness' credibility, and credibility 
is always relevant," cited by both the Hairston Court and the State in its Respondent's 
Brief. Id. (See also Hairston at 503; Respondent's Brief, p.6.) 
Hairston and Arledge stand for the unexceptional proposition that impeachment 
evidence, evidence that rebuts testimony provided by a witness, is relevant. These 
cases do not stand for the proposition apparently espoused by the State that if evidence 
could potentially be relevant to credibility, it will always be admissible. In the present 
case, Ms. Yeager's testimony was not admitted to impeach any testimony provided by 
any witness nor could it, as Ms. Yeager was the first witness to testify. The State's 
reliance on Hairston and Arledge is misplaced. 1 
Furthermore, the State cites to State v. Duft, 139 Idaho 99 (Ct. App. 2003), in 
which the Idaho Court of Appeals "discussed the proper scope of Ms. Yeager's 
testimony, and approved her testimony about 'general behavioral and emotional 
characteristics of victims and offenders in child sexual abuse.' Such testimony is proper 
because it assists the jury in 'evaluating the victim's credibility.'" (Respondent's Brief, 
p.7 (citing Duft at 105.)) The State further asserts that Mr. Aguilar "has offered no 
reasoned basis for concluding Ms. Yeager's testimony regarding the long-term effects of 
1 The State further cites as persuasive authority State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786 (Ct. App. 
2012) in which the Court of Appeals discussed "the admissibility of prior felony 
convictions, which requires the court to consider 'whether the fact or nature of the 
conviction is relevant to the credibility of the witness.'" (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The 
Grist opinion, however, is irrelevant to the present case as Grist dealt specifically with 
the application of I.R.E. 609 which is in and of itself is a rule describing the 
circumstances upon which a prior felony conviction will be admissible specifically to 
attack the credibility of a witness. 
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sexual abuse is not relevant for this same purpose." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The 
State's reliance upon Dutt is misplaced. 
In Dutt, over defense objection, 
Yeager testified at trial in general terms concerning the progression of 
sexual abuse through various phases. Yeager also testified in general 
terms about the behavior and characteristics of victims and offenders as 
the sexual abuse progresses through each phase, including the victims' 
tendency to delay disclosing the abuse and the possible reasons for 
the delay. 
Dutf at 104 (emphasis added). In upholding the district court's decision to allow 
Ms. Yeager's testimony, the Court of Appeals did not hold that anything Ms. Yeager 
testified to would necessarily be admissible; rather, the Court held, 
The issue of whether the victim's conduct in disclosing the details of 
her sexual abuse in the present case was consistent with the behavior of 
other sexually abused children was a matter beyond the common 
experience of the jury and was, therefore, a proper subject of testimony by 
a qualified expert. Yeager's generalized testimony gave the jurors 
specialized knowledge that could assist them in evaluating the victim's 
credibility. 
Id. (citing State v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806, 811-812 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis 
added). Thus, while the Court of Appeals recognized that Ms. Yeager's testimony in 
that case was relevant to credibility, the Court's focus was specific to the issue of how 
the discloser occurred in that case, an issue of credibility in and of itself. The Court did 
not, however, signal that there would be no limitation to this type of testimony. 
In the present case, the jury simply did not need to consider how a victim of 
sexual abuse will be impacted in the long-term in order to determine whether or not the 
alleged victims in the case at hand were molested by Mr. Aguilar. The State correctly 
notes that defense counsel asked two of the alleged victims about their mental health 
history and current medications. (Respondent's brief, p.8 (citing Trial Tr., p.375, LA -
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p.376, L.11; p.404, Ls.9-16).) However, merely asking the children whether they 
suffered from mental health issues, did not make the origins of their mental illnesses 
relevant. Unlike in Dutt where the jury was given a description of the phenomenon of 
delayed disclosure - an explanation to a lay adult for why a child victim may not 
immediately report sexual abuse - promiscuity, substance abuse, body-image issues, 
and mental illness occur in all manner of people, regardless of whether or not the 
person suffering from these maladies have been sexually abused. C.B. and J.A.'s 
testimony that they were abused at the hands of Mr. Aguilar is not more credible merely 
because they suffer from mental illness. 
Furthermore, there was no temporal limitation placed on Ms. Yeager's testimony. 
While the prosecutor argued to the district court that the testimony was relevant 
because, "these boys are going to be talking about what happened to them years ago, 
they are dealing with it now," the question itself posed no time limitation. (Tr. 2/23/10, 
p.205, Ls.10-16.) The question actually asked solicited information about the "long-term 
impact of the abuse" - not about what the alleged victims may be dealing with currently. 
Id. Ms. Yeager answered the actual question asked to her and testified to all manner of 
negative consequence - from chemical dependency, to promiscuity, to mental illness -
all of which are generally frowned upon by society at large. The State's argument is 
without merit. 
The State further asserts that even if the district court erred in admitting this 
testimony, the error is harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) Mr. Aguilar asserts the 
State's arguments are not compelling and the State has failed to meet the high burden 
established in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Light Of 
The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
Mr. Aguilar asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence. His arguments in support are contained in the Appellant's Brief 
and need not be repeated herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Aguilar respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand 
his case to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that 
this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence to no more than six years. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 2012. 
JtX:SON C. PI TLER 
(f/ 
!eputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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